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DISTRICT COURT DIGESTS
The following are digests of opinions selected by the judges of the District
Courts of North Dakota as dealing with interesting or significant points of
law. In view of the fact that these opinions are not regularly published,
the North Dakota Law Review presents these digests in the hope that they
will be of value to the bar.
APPEALS FROM POLICE MAGISTRATE'S COURT
CITY OF MINOT v. KITZMAN, District Court for the fifth judicial district of
North Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge. Paul Campbell appeared as attorney
for plaintiff-appellant; Joseph P. Stevens represented defendant-respondent.
Defendant had entered a plea of guilty before the police magistrate of
Minot, but was allowed a new trial by the magistrate and was found inno-
cent. An appeal by the city to the District Court was dismissed on the ground
that the city had no right of appeal from the final decision of the police
magistrate.
The court cited North Dakota Constitution section 113 which provides for
the creation arid jurisdiction (all cases arising under ordinances of a city)
of police magistrates. Section 114 provides that appeals shall lie from final
decisions of police magistrates ". . . as may be prescribed by law." Sections
103 and 113 limit the District Court to exercise of appellate jurisdiction
with respect to the final decisions of police magistrates.
Section 40-1819, N. D. Rev. Code (1943), relating to police magistrates,
provides in part: "An appeal may be taken to the district court from any
judgment in a police magistrate's court . . . in the same manner as is provided
for the taking of an appeal from a justice's court generally . . ." Section
33-1240 relating to justice courts, specifies that "An appeal in a criminal ac-
tion duly perfected transfers the action to the district court for trial anew
regardless of any ruling or decision of the justice . . . " However, the court
pointed out that the District Court has only appellate jurisdiction of final
decisions of police magistrates. Thus it appears that Section .40-1819 was
ineffective as an attempt to provide for appeals from decisions of police magis-
trates, and that such appeals are not now possible.
At any rate, Section 40-1819 provides for appeals only by defendants, thus
precluding plaintiff-city from taking an appeal. The court stated that ".... the
right of review of the decision of the inferior tribunal must be exercised by
writ of certiorari".
FRAUD IN INCEPTION OF DEED
SIGGERUD v. Bs.AcKsrscK, Civil No. 3025, District Court for the fifth judicial
district of North Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge. R. H. Points and Higgins
and Donahue appeared for plaintiffs. F. Leslie Forsgren represented defend-
ants.
Action to quiet title. Defendant claims as a bona fide purchaser for value
of a mineral deed of an undivided one half interest in the minerals under the
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land involved. Plaintiff contends that the mineral deed involved was exe-
cuted as a result of fraud in its inception and is therefore void for all purposes.
The testimony indicated that Carl Siggerud was the owner of one half the
mineral estate under 680 acres of land. He is a farmer, 58 years old. His
education ended with the 8th grade and he has had little business experience.
One McKee, the husband of a cousin of Siggerud and a long time resident
of the same community, asked to purchase an oil and gas lease of Siggerud's
mineral rights. All negotiations dealt only with the execution of such a lease.
The price paid was 10 cents per acre.
McKee actually presented for Siggerud's signature both an oil and gas
lease and a mineral deed, covering the top of the latter to conceal its nature.
At the. time of the signing Siggerud was without his glasses and so unable
to read the documents, and he signed them relying entirely on the integrity
of McKee. He did not discover the fraud until much later when it was pointed
out to him that the record showed he had in fact executed a mineral deed.
The deed was subsequently transferred to defendants, bona fide purchasers for
value.
The court found there was clear and convincing evidence that the execu-
tion of the mineral deed was the result of deliberate fraud, and that Siggerud
had not failed to exercise reasonable care in the course of the transaction in
view of the relationship between him and McKee. "The fraud in this case
having gone to the execution of the instrument rather than the inducement,
and proof of the fraud being clear and unequivocal and its force undiminished
by negligence on the part of the Plaintiff Siggerud, this Court, sitting as a
court of equity, must declare the deed void in the hands of the Defendants as
innocent purchasers."
FRAUD - MISREPRESENTATION OF STATE OF MIND
SMITH V. WATSON, Civil No. 7970, District Court for the fifth judicial dis-
trict of North Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge. C. A. Waldron appeared
as attorney for plaintiff. John F. Unwin represented defendant.
Plaintiff executed an oil and gas lease to defendant in exchange for a draft
for $7,200 drawn by defendant on the Merchant's Bank of Rugby, North
Dakota. Though defendant promised to pay the draft within thirty days after
its issuance, the draft was not paid and defendant ignored plaintiff's repeated
requests for return of the lease. No efforts to pay the draft were made until
more than four months after the date upon which defendant promised payment
would be made. The court found that there was no substantial justification for
this delay in making payment for the lease.
Defendant recorded the lease the day after its execution. As a result, the
land covered by the lease was removed from the market for oil and gas lease
prospects during the period, the lease was on record. Defendant eventually
sold the lease to an innoceri. purchaser for value for $14,000.
.The court found that though the defendant had promised unconditionally to
pay the draft given for the lease within thirty days after its execution, he had
no funds in the bank upon which the draft was drawn, and intended to pay it
within thirty days only in the event that he located a buyer for the lease within
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that period. At the time of the execution of the lease, the defendant had no
contemplated purchaser. N.D. Rev. Code § 9-0308 (1943) provides in part:
"Actual Fraud Defined. Actual fraud within the meaning of this title
consists of any of the following acts committed by a party to the contract,
or with his connivance, with ,intent to deceive.another party thereto or to
induce him to enter into the contract:
"4. A promise made without any intention of performing it; or
"5. Any other act fitted to deceive."
"Under the view taken by this court, the conduct of the defendant Watson
in making an unconditional promise to pay the draft within thirty days, when
performance of such promise was dedendent upon contingencies known to him
and unknown to the plaintiff, constitutes an act fitted to deceive the plaintiff
which act was material in inducing the execution and delivery of the oil and
gas lease and without which the oil and gas lease might never have been exe-
cuted."
It has long been recognized that fraud may be predicated on nonperform-
ance of a promise when, at the time the promise is made the promisor has
no intention to perform, but intends by such promise to deceive the promsee
and induce him to act otherwise than he would have acted but for such prom-
ise. (citing cases). "The instant case calls for an extension of this principle in
a case where the promisor while not without any intention of performing, en-
tertains the mental reservation that the promise will be performed upon the
happening of certain contingencies known to him and not known to the
promisee."
N. D. Rev. Code § 59-0106 (1943) provides in part:
"Implied Trust; How Created. An implied trust arises in the following
cases:
"2. One who gains a thing by fraud, accident, mistake, undue influence,
the violation of a trust, or other wrongful act, is, unless he has some other
and better right thereto, an implied trustee of the thing gained for the
benefit of the person who would otherwise have had it;"
"Thus in the case at bar, defendant Watson by receiving the sum of $14,000
as consideration for the assignment of the oil and gas lease executed by the
plaintiff must hold such sum of money as an implied trustee in favor of the
plaintiff."
LABOR LAW - JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS
'MINOR v. BUILDING AND CONSTRUCTION TRADES COUNCIL, District Court for
the fifth judicial district of North Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge.
Plaintiffs, two partners doing business as Oil Field Service Company, ask
that. defendants be permanently enjoined from interfering with, molesting
or damaging the business of plaintiffs by picketing or otherwise. Plaintiffs are
contractors engaged in constructing a natural gas processing plant for the
Signal Oil and Gas Company. Defendants are the Building and Construction
Trades Council in affiliation with the American Federation of Labor, several
allied labor unions, and the respective officers and agents of these organiza-
tions.
Construction of the plant began in the spring of 1953. Plaintiffs employed
NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW
from 35 to 90 employees during the summer and fall, none of whom were
union members. Applicants who were affiliated with unions were refused em-
ployment. A contractor who had been participating in the job prior to this
action had taken a vote among his employees who voted not "to go union",
and later had discharged one of its men for violation of an order not to dis-
cuss with other employees the matter of joining a union. In July representa-
tives of the defendant labor organizations conferred with representatives of
plaintiffs in an unsuccessful effort to negotiate union security contracts with
the respective unions. Later these representatives of defendants also attempted,
without success, to persuade the Signal Oil and Gas Company to influence
plaintiffs to make the project a union job or to replace plaintiffs with a union
contractor. Thereupon, on August 21, 1953 defendants placed pickets at the
entrances to the plant site where they displayed placards stating, "This project
unfair to organized labor". "In one group one of the pickets held a camera
and seemingly took photographs of persons and vehicles entering the plant
site, while another picket seemingly wrote down the license numbers or other
data on persons entering the plant site. The pickets consisted of several rep-
resentatives of the defendant labor organizations. Picketing was carried on by
walking back and forth in a rotating manner directly across and in front of
the plant entrances. In no instances, however, was actual force used to pre-
vent persons or vehicles from entering the plant site." As a result of the refusals
of members of other unions to cross the picket lines, the arrival at the plant
site of one truckload of supplies and one carload of cement was delayed. None
of the pickets were employees of plaintiffs and none of plaintiffs' employees
ceased work.
It was stipulated that the construction was work affecting interstate com-
merce, and within the jurisdictional policies of the Natoinal Labor Relations
Board. The testimony indicates that defendants' objective in picketing was to
secure unon security contracts for the construction projects, and that fail-
ing to achieve this by negotiation, defendants sought their objective through
coercive picketing. Defendants also sought to require Signal Oil and Gas
Company to cease doing business with plaintiffs, thus violating Section 8(b)
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. In these circumstances, the
National Labor Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction over the activities
constituting unfair labor practices. "However, the state is not excluded from
exercising its police power if the unfair labor practice is attended by conduct
coircive in nature."
The legislative policy of the State of North Dakota is indicated by the fol-
lowing statute, as well as by a number of similar related provisions.
N. D. Rev. Code § 34-0913 (Supp. 1953). "Boycotting, Secondary Boy-
cotting, and Sympathy Strikes Against Public Policy. Boycotting, secondary
boycotting and sympathy strikes are hereby declared to be against the pub-
lic policy and against the peace and dignity of the state of North Dakota
and shall be subject to restraint by the district courts of the state of North
Dakota as well as suits for damages therein."
"Clearly, coercive picketing, as distinguished from persuasive picketing lim-
ited to the display of a banner or the utterance of words not unlawful in na-
ture, which effectively created a secondary boycott is a vice condemned by
the law of the State of North Dakota." . . . . "The use of pencil and pad and
the pretended if not actual use of a camera, coupled with the formation of a
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picket line rotating in front of the entrance to the plant site, are activities which,
unless restrained, are likely to precipitate violence and are in excess of the right
of free speech."
Though plaintiffs' refusal to hire union members is an unfair labor practice
under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, such conduct is malum
prohibitum, not malum in se. Plaintiffs therefore are not precluded from re-
ceiving the aid of a court of equity, in view of the fact that in disputes of this
nature not only the immediate parties, but society as a whole, has an interest.
In the exercise of the police power, this court will grant a permanent in-
junction, but it will prohibit defendants only from use of "coircive measures
calculated or likely to intimidate or threaten retaliation to persons engaging
in business intercourse with the plaintiff Oil Field Service Company." Thus,
"the use of cameras and the taking of notes with pencil and paper and the
maintenance of a rotating picket line as an obstruction" will be forbidden.
Peaceful picketing may not be enjoined since it is a form of free speech pro-
tected by the Constitution of the United States, and since such activity falls
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board.
OIL AND GAS LEASES - DELAY RENTALS
SELLiE v. STANOLIND OIL & GAS Co., Civil No. 2975, District Court for the
fifth judicial district of North Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge. Milton K.
Higgins appeared for plaintiff, while William R. Pearce and John C. Gunness
represented defendant.
This is an action to quiet title in which plaintiff asks that an oil and gas
lease which he gave to defendant be declared terminated, so as to remove it
as a cloud on the title.
The lease provided that if drilling operations were not begun it would ter-
minate after one year unless upon the anniversary date of the lease the lessee
paid $400 to the lessor's agent in the manner prescribed. Such payment per-
mitted deferring of drilling operations for 12 months, and further payments
could similarly extend the period within the primary term of the lease. The
lease provided that rental payments could be diminished in the event that the
interest of the lessor were discovered to be less than the full undivided fee.
It was stipulated that defendant was informed by the Bank of North Dakota
that it was the owner of one half the minerals under part of the land involved.
Accordingly, defendant deposited only $240 with the plaintiff's agent to cover
delay rentals for the 12 months period from April 15, 1952. It was further
agreed that plaintiff is in fact the sole owner in fee of the land involved.
The court held that the lease terminated ipso facto April 15, 1952 upon the
failure of defendant to make the proper delay rental payment. It is elementary
that plaintiff cannot be held responsible for the inaccurate information trans-
mitted to defendant by the Bank of North Dakota. The fact that plaintiff
accepted and retained for about a year the insufficient rental payments before
notifying defendant of the termination of the lease does not estop plaintiff
from asserting that the termination resulted. Certain decisions have held that
acceptance of delay rentals after the date upon which they were due created
an estoppel against the lessor, but each of these cases involved a change in
position of the lessee (typically, beginning to drill) in reliance upon the ac-
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ceptance of the late rental payment. The stipulated facts show no change in
position on the part of defendant.
The lease provided that no change in ownership of the land should be
binding on the lessee until he was furnished with certified copies of the
instruments involved in the change. The defendant-lessee, having chosen not
to rely on this protection, must suffer the consequences of that choice.
RESIDUARY STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
WrrraocK V. WEISS, District Court for the fifth judicial district of North
Dakota, A. J. Gronna, Judge.
Plaintiff brought action to quiet title to certain land located in Williams
County, claiming as heir of the holder of the fee simple interest who died in
1916. Defendant pleads the statute of limitations. N. D. Rev. Code § 28-0122
(1943) provides:
"Limitations on Actions Not Specifically Provided for. An action for re-
lief not otherwise provided for must be commenced within ten years after
the cause of action shall have accrued."
This is primarily an equitable action to remove a cloud on the title in the
form of a tax deed issued to defendant in 1947 by Williams County, and is
therefore governed by the residuary statute of limitations quoted above.
One in possession of land has a continuing right to have a cloud on his title
removed. This right is analogous to that created by a continuing trespass; thus,
as long as the possession is maintained a cause of action for removal of a cloud
on the title continues to accrue and is not barred by the statute of limitations.
Therefore, plaintiff's action is barred only if he has been continuously out of
possession for ten years prior to this action.
Williams County took a tax deed to the land involved on March 1, 1940.
From 1940 till 1943 it leased the land for grazing purposes, and it had summer
fallowed eighteen and one half acres of the land in 1943. The court found
that this constituted adverse possession of the land by the county or its agent
at least for 1943. In November, 1943 defendant entered into a contract for
deed to the land with Williams County and he has been in actual possession
since that time. The possession of the County under a tax deed is not necesasrily
sufficiently adverse during the persistence of the former owner's statutory right
to repurchase to initiate the running of the ten year statute which vests a new
title in one who has been in adverse possession under color of title and who
has paid the taxes assessed against the land during that ten year period. N. D.
Rev. Code § 47-0603 (1943). Such possession, however, is sufficient to sup-
port a finding that plaintiff has been out of possession so as to permit the run-
ning of the ten year residuary statute of limitations. Since there was privity
between the County and defendant, its grantee, "tacking" is permitted; or,
more accurately, legal possession did not revert to plaintiff when actual pos-
session was transferred from the County to defendant. Therefore, plaintiff
has been continuously out of possession for ten years beginning with 1948,
and his action is barred by the ten year residuary statute of limitations.
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SALE OF PUBLIC LANDS
ST&TE OF NORTH DAKOTA V. AMERADA PETROLEUM CORPORATION, et 0,
Civil No. 8301, District Court for the fifth judicial district of North Dakota,
Eugene A. Burdick, Judge.
The State of North Dakota and another brought this action to quiet title
to certain land in Williams County. In 1929 the land was mortgaged to the
State of North Dakota by Ernest Bylin, owner in fee simple, and his wife, to
secure a loan made by the Board of University and School lands from trust
funds held for the hospital for the insane. Foreclosure resulted, Bylin failed to
redeem, and a sheriff's deed was issued to the State of North Daokta and
recorded September 25, 1941. September 28, 1944 the Board of University
and School Lands executed a contract for sale of the land to Bylin on the
theory that though the period for redemption from the mortgage had expired,
he was authorized to repurchase by N. D. Laws 1943 c. 231 for the total
amount owed the state when it took possession of the land. Later this contract
was assigned to one Kvam who paid the balance of the purchase price and
received a quit claim deed from the Board of University and School Lands.
The claims of all defendants who appeared depend upon the validity of these
transactions with Bylin and Kvam since those claims are derived from the
title of Kvam.
N. D. Laws 1941, c. 252 provides in part:
"§ 1. The Board of University and School Lands is hereby authorized
to sell to bona fide farmers only, any of the lands within its control and
belonging to any of the permanent school or institutional funds exclusive
of Federal Grant Lands in the manner and upon the terms herein provided:
"(1) Manner of Sale:
"All such lands shall be appraised by the Commissioner of University and
School Lands or his deputy or representatives such appraisal to be approved
by the Board of University and School Lands and shall be sold for not
less than the appraised value and not less than the amount of permanent
school funds invested therein to the highest bidder at public sale conducted
at the front door of the Court House in the county seat of the county where-
in the lands to be sold lie between the hours of nine o'clock in the forenoon
and four o'clock in the afternoon."
N. D. Laws 1943, c. 231 amended subsection (1) by adding the following
paragraph:
"(b) If the mortgagor or former owner from whom the lands were ac-
quired or his widow or one or more of his lineal descendants, who in all
cases must be a bona fide farmer residing upon the land, not less than three
days prior to a public sale of such land, shall make a bona fide offer to re-
purchase such lands at a price not less than the combined amounts of the
original unpaid loan plus costs paid by the state and interest unpaid at
the time the state acquired title to such lands, the Board of University and
School Lands shall resell any such lands to any such bona fide applicant
at such sale upon the terms and conditions provided for in this chapter
except that upon such private sale the cash payment shall be not less than
twenty per cent of the sale price."
The court noted that the 1943 amendment did not take effect until nearly
two years after the mortgage loan to Bylin, and that the amendment "was
not within the contemplation of the parties nor within the scope of the mort-
gage contract". Further, it was stipulated that Bylin at no time resided upon
the land and that Kvam is not related by blood or affinity to Bylin.
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The court rejected the contention that the 1943 amendment was intended
to constitute an extension of the right of redemption. The act is couched
in such terms as "repurchase", "resell" and "sale" and makes no mention of
redemption. The 1941 act also does not deal with the right of redemption;
rather, it is devoted entirely to the method of sale of the lands involved.
If it were conceded that the 1943 amendment creates an extension of the
right of redemption the act would be unreasonably discriminatory since the
right is accorded only to a "bona fide farmer residing upon the land." (em-
phasis by the court). Were the class restricted only to "bona fide farmers"
or their lineal descendants it could be considered a plausible effort to foster
the basic industry of agriculture. As the class is now defined, the right to the
benefits of the act may depend upon the coincidence of the location of the
residence buildings on the land involved, or in some cases upon whether the
person seeking to repurchase has been successful in an effort to become a
tenant of the State, so as to be "residing upon the land." "Proper classifica-
tion is permitted, but arbitrary and unreasonable discrimination is forbidden."
Viewing the 1943 amendment as conferring a right to repurchase the land
under the conditions prescribed, the definition of the class of person permitted
to repurchase remains fatally discriminatory.
The provision for private sale contained in the 1943 amendment also vio-
lates section 185 of the North Dakota Constitution in that it makes a donation
to a privileged buyer by enabling him to buy for less than the price that
probably would have been realized at a public sale. That provision also con-
flicts with section 160 of the North Dakota Constitution which provides by
reference that such lands shall be sold at public auction to the highest bidder.
See Herr v. Rudolph, 75 N. D. 91, 26 N.W. 2d 916 (1947).
Since the statute under which the deed was issued to Kvam is unconsti-
tutional, it is as if the law had never existed, rights cannot be built up under
it, and the attempted transfer of the land was ineffectual. The court therefore,
has equitable jurisdiction to cancel the deed as a cloud on the record title,
even though the rights of bona fide purchasers from the supposed grantee
will be destroyed. The state may not be estopped by the issuance of a deed
without compliance with statutory or constitutional requirements, such a deed
being void from its inception, and its issuance beyond the authority of the
officers who executed it. The deed to Kvam will be cancelled, and the consid-
eration he paid will be refunded.
TAX TITLES
ANDERSON v. RUSSELL, District Court for the fifth judicial district of North
Dakota, Eugene A. Burdick, Judge.
Plaintiff brought action to quiet title to certain land. Two defendants ap-
peared, alleging ownership of the land in fee simple and asking that title be
quieted in them. Plaintiff's reply alleged in part that since defendants had
not been seized or possessed of the land within, twenty years prior to this
action, their defense and counterclaim was barred by the statute of limitations.
Plaintiff claimed title to the lands in controversy through two tax title pro-
ceedings. Defendants contended that the notices of expiration of the periods
of redemption in these proceedings were fatally defective since they stated a
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single amount necessary to redeem which included delinquent taxes for 1925
and subsequent delinquent taxes for 1926, 1927 and 1928. Defendants fur-
ther contended that the 1926, 1927 and 1928 taxes had not been sold more
-than three years prior to .the giving of the notices, as required by the alleged-
ly applicable statutes. The notices were dated January 4, 1930 and served
during 1930. The District Court held that these alleged defects did not ren-
der the proceedings invalid since the proceedings transpired prior to the, en-
actment of Laws of 1931 c. 298 and Laws of 1939 c. 235, the effect .of which
was to relieve the redemptioner of the duty to pay any taxes other than those
due at a tax .sale had three years prior to the notices of expiration of the
period of redemption. Kelsch v. Miller, 73 N. D. 405, 15 N.W. 2d 433 (1944).
.Also, in 1930 the law did not require the County Auditor to state separately
the amount of tax, penalty and interest for each year 'roperly included in the
notice of expiration of the period of redemption.
Defendants also contended that plaintiff, purchaser of the tax title, holds
that title in trust for defendants on the theory that plaintiff had mortgaged the
land to defendants and as mortgagor had a duty to pay the taxes which were
the basis for the tax title proceedings, and so cannot be permitted to profit
by the violation of that duty. The court concluded, however, that the fore-
closure of the mortgage for the full amount of the indebtedness had operated
as complete discharge of the obligations of the mortgagor with respect to the
land and had terminated the duty of the mortgagor to pay the taxes out of
which the tax title arose. The relationship of mortgagor and mortgagee had
thus been terminated prior to the purchase of the tax title by the mortgagor.
The court also found merit in plaintiff's allegation that defendants had not
been seized or possessed of the land within twenty years prior to this action.
Judgment quieting title in plaintiffs against all defendantts.
FOR SALE:-U. S. Supreme Court Digest; Modern Legal Forms; Words and
Phrases; All complete and up to date. Write or call Paul Campbell, Attor-
ney at Law, Room 2-A Jacobson Block, Minot, North Dakota.
PUBLICATION NO. I OF AMERICAN BAR RESEARCH CENTER NOW
AVAILABLE*
The first publication of the American Bar Research Center containing a
list of unpublished legal theses and of current legal research projects in
American law schools is now available at the publication cost of $1.50. Until
the opening of the Research Center, copies of this valuable publication will
be available by writing to John C. Cooper, Administrator of the American
Bar Research Center, 240 Nassau Street, Princeton, New Jersey.
Part of the work of the Research Center has been designated as the
"Research Clearing House." The purpose of the Clearing House is to ob-
tain information as to unpublished legal theses in the libraries and files of
[From AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION JOURNAL, Vol. 40, August 1954, p. 69)
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the accredited law schools of the United States, and also current legal research
projects in such law schools. This information as received is catalogued and
classified by appropriate subjects so that the Research Center may be in
position to furnish information readily to those interested. From time to
time lists of such theses and research projects will be published. The present
publication is the first of such lists. Supplements will be issued periodically.
Part I of this publication includes a list of unpublished legal theses showing
the name of author, title of paper, date and the library where the thesis is on
file. If any other library or any person interested desires to have access to
any of these theses, arrangements must be made in each case with the de-
pository library.
Part II, the list of current legal research projects, includes the name of
tie person engaged in each project, the subject matter and the place where
the research is being carried on.
